The kamikaze drone delivery from Türkiye to Kosovo in recent weeks caused a short-term crisis on the Belgrade and Pristina line.
However, immediately after the harsh statements on October 8, tensions eased when Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic softened his tone.
The crisis was an example of Türkiye’s position and policies in the region.
While Türkiye has been increasing its exports to the Balkans in recent years, it also comes to the fore with the defense agreements it has made with various countries.
According to some experts, this marks a significant break from the cultural diplomacy-oriented soft power policy implemented until a decade ago.
BBC News Turkish He researched how Türkiye’s Balkans policy has changed in recent years.
‘Defense agreements instead of Turkish education scholarships’
Albania, Kosovo, Romania and Serbia are among dozens of countries where Türkiye has expanded its UAV export network with the collaborations signed in recent years.
Similarly, Türkiye is expanding its cooperation in this field by signing military framework agreements with many Balkan countries.
One of the highlights among these agreements was that Otokar, one of the Koç Holding companies, signed an armored vehicle tender agreement with the Romanian Ministry of Defense worth approximately 857 million euros in 2024.
Some experts consider these developments as ‘an important break in Türkiye’s Balkans policy in the last decade’.
During the prime ministry of Ahmet Davutoğlu between 2014 and 2016, a soft power policy that prioritized cultural and religious ties was implemented in the Balkans.
BBC News TurkishSpeaking to , Senior Researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, Vuk Vuksanovic, says that after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt following Davutoğlu’s departure, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “was the face of interpersonal diplomacy” and emphasized economic investments.
According to Vuksanovic, “there are more signs that Türkiye is trying to gain the influence through its security cooperation and military industry” that it has sought in the past with schools.
“Because this is the philosophy of Turkish politicians today: It is good to give scholarships to students to learn Turkish, but if you have local defense cooperation, it creates a much higher degree and a much stronger political impact,” says Vuksanovic.
‘He wants to be an effective and visible actor in every field’
Türkiye’s cooperation in the Balkans is not limited to defense.
Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, Researcher at SETA Foundation, says that investments are shaped “mostly according to the market”.
“Turkish companies are entering the Balkans in areas where they are strong and where they find opportunities,” he says.
Among these, contracting projects have an important place.
Ekinci reminds that Turkish companies are involved in the Belgrade-Sarajevo highway project, the natural gas pipeline project in Romania and many highway, railway and construction projects in the region.
“Ankara wants to be an effective and visible actor in every field in the region. The more Turkish companies operate in the region, the more Türkiye’s economic presence and visibility increases,” he comments.
Ekinci emphasizes that Turkish companies also operate in the Balkans in the fields of transportation, mining, banking, tourism, energy, health and telecommunications.
‘Bilateral relations are so important that differences are resolved quickly’
The tension between Serbia and Kosovo is at the center of Türkiye’s Balkans policy.
Türkiye and Serbia follow diametrically opposed policies regarding Kosovo. This may cause ups and downs in Ankara-Belgrade relations.
Kosovo has been on the agenda for many years with tensions between Albanians, who constitute the majority of its population, and Serbs, who are in the minority.
In February 2008, it unilaterally declared independence from Serbia.
Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo.
Today, Kosovo is recognized by more than 100 countries, including the United States and some countries in the European Union.
However, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, with the support of its strong ally Russia.
The same is true for most ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.
Türkiye continues to develop close relations with Kosovo in different areas, from defense to culture. It also supports Kosovo’s right to establish its own army through different agreements.
Within the scope of the agreements between the two countries, it was recently announced that the Machinery and Chemical Industry (MKE) will establish a cartridge production facility with an annual production capacity of 20 million units in Kosovo.
The project is planned to be completed in 2026.
Ekinci thinks that the Skydagger UAVs that Kosovo purchased from Türkiye are also part of this general trend:
“Kosovo, whose security is largely dependent on NATO (KFOR), sees Serbia as a significant threat. For this reason, it wants to quickly establish its own army and do this in harmony with NATO.”
Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo, reacts to these developments.
The country had previously announced that it had given up its decision to purchase UAVs from Türkiye in a similar crisis in 2023.
BBC News TurkishAnswering ‘s questions, Armend Bekaj, senior researcher at Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, thinks that this is because “any move by Kosovo to strengthen its defense and security (no matter how normal and prudent it may be for an independent country) is portrayed as a threat to Serbia.”
‘Serbia will always continue to be in the centre’
However, similar to recent events, tensions have so far not caused permanent damage to relations.
During his visit to Belgrade in 2024, Erdoğan said that the two countries were experiencing a “golden age” in their relations.
Ekinci says, “Considering the difficulties Vucic is currently experiencing in domestic and foreign politics, it would not be an expected development for him to give up dialogue and cooperation with Türkiye.”
Vuk Vuksanovic comments, “Bilateral relations are still so important that differences are resolved quickly,” and explains this as follows:
“For Bosnians, there is frequent disappointment that Belgrade receives the investments despite receiving messages of closeness from Türkiye.
“But for Turkey, Serbia remains the key country in the Balkans and is probably the most economically functional compared to its neighbors, despite all its problems. Therefore, it will always remain in the centre.”
Vuksanovic reminds that Türkiye wants to increase its influence in the Balkans and adds:
“This means that (the Turks) cannot neglect the Albanians, another very important ethnic group, as well as the Serbs, and therefore the UAV delivery. That is why trade and relations come across as such a strange mixture of love and hate.”
‘Erdogan’s biggest advantage is that he can talk to everyone’
There are also those who think that one of Türkiye’s most important advantages in this region, where both Western countries and Russian influence is strong, is Erdogan’s leadership style.
Vuk Vuksanovic says, “Türkiye’s biggest advantage in the Balkans is that Erdogan is a goal-oriented leader who can communicate with them fundamentally. He can make agreements with each ethno-religious group individually, as he wishes.”
Vuksanovic also thinks that Türkiye’s multifaceted policy of interacting with both the West and Russia is “attractive” to countries such as Serbia.
Serbia’s “four-pillar” foreign policy doctrine promotes balanced cooperation with all geopolitical actors.
‘Ethnic and religious tensions require sensitivity’
According to experts, ethnic and religious tensions in the region constitute one of the most important fault lines for countries like Türkiye.
Mehmet Uğur Ekinci says, “The problems in the region require Türkiye to act sensitively and balancedly in its relations. As in recent developments, an engagement with one side may attract a reaction from the other side.”
Vuk Vuksanovic explains the risks Türkiye faces in this regard as follows:
“If Turkey goes too far, for example, in fomenting a version of political Islam or a form of nationalism that the majority Christian countries or the Balkans do not approve of, it may run the risk of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and other countries cooperating against Türkiye.”
In its foreign policy, Türkiye defines itself as a part of the Balkans and says it is taking steps to preserve peace.
Lastly, representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Albania and Kosovo attended the Balkan Peace Conference held in Istanbul on July 26.
In his statement after the meeting, Foreign Minister Fidan said, “We came together to find Balkan solutions to Balkan problems and to create concrete projects. We discussed regional issues.”
‘Religious radicalization concerns’
For some Balkan countries, the radicalization of the Muslim youth population is one of the most important concerns.
During the civil war in Syria, Kosovo was known as one of the countries with the highest number of ISIS volunteers per capita in Europe.
According to a 2017 UN survey, nearly 70 percent of Kosovars believed there was a radicalization problem in their society.
Nearly a quarter of those surveyed said they knew someone who had been radicalized.
Armend Bekaj says that these concerns continue today and are not limited to Kosovo:
“There are concerns that there are religious initiatives originating and supported from within Türkiye, leading to the radicalization of young people in countries such as Kosovo, North Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina,” he says.
Ekinci, on the other hand, argues that Türkiye’s investment in religious projects has the opposite effect:
“Today, Turkey is seen as an important regional actor, especially in terms of economy and security. Its restoration activities are welcomed in terms of preserving the historical heritage of the region, and its support for religious institutions is welcomed in terms of preventing radical movements.”
